Results Framework

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A. Introduction

On June 12, 2012 the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA). The GPSA is a coalition of donors, governments and CSOs that supports civil society and governments to work together to solve critical governance challenges in developing countries. To achieve this objective, the GPSA provides strategic and sustained support to CSOs’ social accountability initiatives aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability. It builds on the World Bank’s direct and ongoing engagement with public sector actors, as well as on a network of Global Partner organizations, to create an enabling environment in which citizen feedback is used to solve fundamental problems in service delivery and to strengthen the performance of public institutions.

Through a country-tailored approach, GPSA-supported activities are implemented in sectors where the World Bank has a strong involvement and can help governments respond to citizen feedback. The GPSA works to “close the loop” by supporting citizens to have a more articulated voice, helping governments to listen, and assisting government agencies to act upon the feedback they receive. Ultimately, this helps the countries to improve development results and to reach the goals of ending extreme poverty and fostering shared prosperity.

The GPSA is governed by a Steering Committee (SC) comprised of CSO, government and donor agency representatives. The SC is chaired by a WB Vice-President. The Partnership’s scope encompasses two main areas:

| Grants for Social Accountability | The GPSA awards grants to CSOs and networks of CSOs working in countries that have “opted-in” to the Program. Grants are intended to provide strategic and sustained support to CSOs with the following objectives:  
| Addressing critical governance and development problems through social accountability processes that involve citizen feedback and participatory methodologies geared to helping governments and public sector institutions solve these problems. Special emphasis is put on problems that directly affect extreme poor and marginalized populations.  
| Strengthening civil society’s capacities for social accountability by investing in CSOs’ institutional strengthening and through mentoring of small, nascent CSOs by well-established CSOs with a track record on social accountability. |
| Knowledge Platform | Offers a global space for facilitating the advancement of knowledge and learning on |


2 Ibid.
social accountability by (1) leveraging the K&L generated through the GPSA-supported grants, and (2) deepening and expanding networks of social accountability practitioners from CSOs, governments and donor agencies to foster constructive engagement for solving governance and development challenges.

The GPSA’s funding is channeled through a Multi-donor Trust Fund, to which the World Bank will contribute US$5 million annually from FY13 through FY16, which brings the Bank’s total commitment to US$20 million. Government bilateral agencies and private foundations may also contribute to the MDTF.\(^3\)

The GPSA Secretariat, supported by the SC, has undertaken a consultation process to develop a Results Framework (RF), as well as a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for the Program. This process has included a series of face-to-face and virtual exchanges to receive feedback and refine the overall RF and M&E system. Both Bank staff and external stakeholders, including donors, practitioners and evaluation specialists were convened for this process.

This document presents the GPSA’s theory of change and results framework. The theory of change provides a description of how the GPSA expects its financial and knowledge support to contribute to realistic, measurable outcomes. It identifies the assumptions underlying this vision as well as the outputs and key contextual factors expected to mediate the effects of the GPSA’s inputs on outcomes within particular countries.

The GPSA’s Results Framework is a tool that will be used to monitor and manage progress and report on delivery. It sets out the indicators and methods that will be used to collect data and measure results that will support learning and adaptation of the GPSA’s interventions, as well as inform their evaluations at different stages of implementation.

**B. Theory of Change**

Through its grant making and its knowledge and learning activities, the GPSA seeks to (1) increase constructive engagement between civil society actors and government decision makers in the executive responsible for improved service delivery; and (2) facilitate collaboration between the social accountability initiatives of civil society actors and state institutions of accountability (sometimes also referred to as “horizontal” or “independent” institutions of accountability) for overseeing actors in the executive responsible for service delivery. These are the two main outcomes of the GPSA’s theory of change (see Figure 1).

\(^3\) As of February of 2014, the following foundations have made contributions to the GPSA: Ford Foundation: US$ 3 million; Open Society Foundations: US$3 million in parallel funding and Aga Khan Foundation U.A.: US$500,000.
Rather than focusing solely on bottom-up citizen action, these two outcomes help to “close the loop” between state-society interactions by encouraging government responsiveness to citizens and civil society actors.

The GPSA will work to achieve these outcomes through three main outputs. Unlike outcomes, which are affected by both the GPSA’s activities and contextual factors (which we discuss below), outputs are actions taken directly by the GPSA itself. The first is the integration of a comprehensive political economy approach into the operational strategies of the GPSA’s grantees borne out of direct engagement with decision makers that have authority over service delivery or the governance of service delivery. The second is the application of political economy analyses by the Bank’s Task Team Leaders (TTLs) and the Country Management Units (CMUs) working with the GPSA grantees. The third is the knowledge and learning that the GPSA will produce through comparative analysis and sharing of grantee activities and experiences among grantees, Global Partners, and other key actors working on social accountability initiatives.

Figure 1: GPSA’s Theory of Change

The GPSA’s theory of change posits that its grant making program and its knowledge and learning activities will work together to produce these three outputs in the operational strategies of GPSA grantees, TTL and CMU work on GPSA projects, and the knowledge and
learning from comparative analysis of grantee activities. These three outputs will then work jointly and in interaction with one another to effect change in the theory’s two main outcomes. Contextual factors within each country context will also interact with the GPSA’s outputs and mediate the impact of the outputs on the outcomes. In addition, the GPSA’s theory of change also expects these three outputs to provide feedback to the GPSA during the course of the GPSA’s lifetime to inform improvements in the design of both the grant making and knowledge and learning activities.4

C. Outcomes

This section elaborates on the GPSA’s focus on promoting constructive engagement between civil society actors and decision makers in the executive, and on increasing collaboration between social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions that aim for improved service delivery and responsiveness to citizen needs.

A growing amount of evidence indicates that neither government actors on their own nor civil society actors on their own can produce improved government transparency or accountability.5 These findings suggest that funders should support social accountability strategies that engage government actors – rather than bypass or ignore them – to achieve their aims.

The GPSA has been set up to take advantage of the World Bank’s official and unique

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4 The GPSA’s theory of change thus differs significantly from other initiatives in transparency and accountability in its emphasis on fostering collaboration and constructive engagement between civil society actors and state decision makers, its explicit political economy approach, and its utilization of the Bank’s unique access to and leverage over state decision makers, its convening power, and its broad-based comparative knowledge across country contexts. Twaweza, for example, aims to stimulate citizen action and government responsiveness through the collection, curation, and dissemination of information and evidence. Although its theory of change acknowledges that citizen action and government responsiveness may affect each other in turn, its theory of change conceptualizes the two outcomes as distinct from one another so that its specific activities focus on having a direct impact on either citizen action or the decisions of authorities, rather than on collaboration and cooperation between civil society and government. Making All Voices Count (MAVC), on the other hand, focuses on encouraging the development of bottom-up innovations that connect citizens and governments in ways that improve government performance. In contrast to the GPSA’s strategy of bringing civil society organizations with well-developed social accountability initiatives together with key decision makers in the executive and state accountability institutions, MAVC provides seed grants for the entrepreneurial development of innovative solutions and technologies, scaling-up grants to incubate promising ideas, and grants to researchers seeking to build an evidence base for what kinds of innovations work and why. [Discuss lessons from Governance Partnership Facility for additional context.]


relationship with governments, the range and reach of its partnership and knowledge services, its convening power, and its ability to complement and reinforce interventions to improve governance implemented by governments themselves. The WB can use its convening power and leverage its traditional engagements with governments to create more space for state-CSO interaction, open policy dialogues to CSOs, and improve the quality of information sharing between grantees and governments. The ability of CSOs to reach government decision-makers when it matters and in ways that have a real chance to influence them are relevant because the success and failure of many social accountability interventions is influenced by CSO’s ability to take advantage of political circumstances (‘windows of opportunity’). ⁶

The Bank is uniquely equipped to understand the capacity and constraints of state institutions and CSOs through its analytic, knowledge, and advisory activities.

The GPSA thus has a distinct ability to add value to the promotion of social accountability in ways other funders cannot. ⁷ These comparative advantages have influenced the GPSA’s decision to maximize its contributions, and complement the efforts of other funders, by focusing on projects that implement collaborative social accountability strategies. ⁸

**Outcome 1: Constructive engagement between actors in civil society and the executive branch of country governments for improved service delivery and responsiveness to citizen needs**

One of the GPSA’s main objectives is to increase constructive engagement between civil society actors and government actors in the executive branch that influence resource allocations and decisions that affect developmental outcomes.

This constructive engagement can entail working together to gather evidence on government performance and service delivery, to apply political pressure for change, or some combination of the two.

Civil society organizations can use different political strategies to try to affect the decisions of government officials. Some organizations use information to confront government actors and try to force them to change policies or behaviors. This kind of adversarial social accountability work relies, for example, on grassroots mobilization, public demonstrations, and naming and shaming campaigns where civil society organizations might, for example, compile data about

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⁸ There are, of course, other initiatives seeking to promote constructive engagement between civil society actors and state decision makers and reformers. The Open Government Partnership (OGP), for example, brings governments and civil society organizations together to develop and implement national action plans for open government initiatives such as right-to-information (RTI) laws. See the OGP Articles of Governance, [http://www.opengovpartnership.org/node/1329](http://www.opengovpartnership.org/node/1329).
the failure of government to meet international standards in order to shame them through press conferences and media coverage. Civil society organizations have also taken governments to court when they are unresponsive to access to information requests.

Other organizations use information to help and work with government actors to improve policies, governance, and development outcomes. Collaborative methods include participatory decision-making processes such as participatory budgeting processes. Such methods presuppose the willingness of CSOs to reach out to decision-makers and engage in a continuous, iterative process of information and responding to information, but CSOs can remain autonomous actors. This process, of course, is not necessarily seamless or characterized by a complete overlap of interests and positions by CSOs and government interlocutors.

While few studies explain the conditions under which each one of these strategies should be used, there is growing consensus that the political context in which a social accountability project is implemented should influence a civil society organization’s choice of political strategy.

CSOs often struggle with identifying potential partners within government with whom they can forge and maintain cooperation and collaboration on shared objectives. They often lack information about both the formal and informal opportunities for engaging in public decision-making processes.

Because of the Bank’s unique relationship with country governments and its access to decision makers within the executive branch of these governments, the GPSA is able to help civil society organizations identify the actors within government who have the competence and authority to influence a particular decision about the allocation of resources or the delivery of public services. The GPSA’s contributions thus extend beyond the funding it provides to its grantees.

By identifying the key government actors at various levels, civil society organizations can then

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produce information that is targeted and tailored to the people who actually have the power to make decisions and allocate resources. The Bank may be particularly helpful in identifying the actors within ministries who typically work behind the scenes and who are less visible to civil society organizations and the general public, yet play a central role in information-gathering and decision-making procedures.

The GPSA will draw on the Bank’s experience and skills working with officials on government reforms and public financial management that Bank staff and country management units have accumulated over time in order to help forge working relationships between government decision makers and civil society organizations to identify collaborative efforts of mutual benefit. By drawing on insights from within the Bank and from relationships with government decision makers, CSOs will be better able to understand and tap into the different stages of the policy making cycle.

By helping civil society organizations to identify potential allies within government, the GPSA can also help to create insider-outsider coalitions for reform and increased resources for public service delivery in which outsiders can generate public discussion and demand for change, while insiders use their political authority and knowledge of the bureaucratic process to push reforms forward as well.

By supporting the politically informed work of these multi-stakeholder partnerships, the GPSA can also contribute to the design of “politically responsive” operational strategies. Such strategies build on knowledge about what policy and development reforms are feasible and can be implemented during the lifespan of a grant given the political opportunities and constraints of a particular context.

The Anticorruption Participatory Initiative (IPAC) in the Dominican Republic provides a concrete example of successful constructive engagement between civil society organizations and government decision makers in the executive branch. In the case of IPAC, a group of

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14 This a success factor for social accountability interventions identified McGee and Gaventa (2010) among others.

15 Levy and Fritz, eds. (2014).

16 Jonathan Fox refers to this strategy of civil society reformers cooperating with higher-level reformers in the state as a “sandwich strategy.” See The Politics of Food in Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization, 1992.
international cooperation agencies led by The World Bank’s country office, brought together pro-reform government officials and civil society actors to discuss, propose, and monitor concrete and feasible good governance measures on an ongoing basis. This initiative identified ten concrete areas and created thematic working groups comprised of reform-oriented government officials and civil society organizations in the same sector. Meetings ranged from several times a year to, in some cases, monthly, and groups worked together to define actionable recommendations for change. In the case of the working group on public financial management, for example, the group decided to push for the creation of a single bank account for the Treasury in order to make it easier to monitor fiscal expenditures.

These working groups made it easier to coordinate reformers – inside, outside and across the government – who previously may not have known about or trusted one another’s efforts. IPAC also made it more likely that individual stakeholders united together to convince key decision-makers to implement anticorruption reforms. As a result, projects have been fast-tracked. Governance milestones appear more likely to be considered. Levels of programmatic coherence are higher.

In other cases, civil society organizations might work together with government actors by gathering data to provide to their government partners for use in internal negotiations with other ministries or officials. Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance might, for example, take evidence produced by civil society partners to discussions with their counterparts in other ministries when they are negotiating the budget.

**Outcome 2: Collaboration between social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions in overseeing service delivery by the executive branch**

The other main objective of the GPSA is to increase collaboration between civil society actors implementing tools for social accountability and state actors that can influence the enforcement and design of official state institutions for bureaucratic accountability in overseeing service delivery by the executive branch.

Again, this collaboration can entail working together to gather evidence and to coordinate efforts for greater accountability by CSOs with efforts by state actors, to apply political pressure for change in coordination with each other, or some combination of the two.

Official state institutions for bureaucratic accountability – sometimes also referred to as “horizontal accountability” – are institutions that oversee and sanction public agencies and

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17 Guerzovich 2011.
18 The effectiveness of collaboration, however, does rest on the assumption that state accountability institutions do not work against each other to block one another’s effectiveness and that there is effective inter-horizontal coordination when necessary. If, for example, a parliamentary oversight committee suppresses the report from the supreme audit institution, collaboration between civil society organizations and the supreme audit institution may not necessarily result in increased government responsiveness.
government officials. Conversely, CSO-led transparency interventions may be more likely to lead to accountability when state oversight bodies use this information to hold government to account and apply sanctions, if necessary.

As the GPSA’s Board Paper notes, social accountability tools and mechanisms – such as citizen report cards, community scorecards, participatory budgeting, and public hearings – are designed to gather systematic citizen feedback on government performance. Such feedback may offer valuable evidence to horizontal accountability agencies in their assessment of public programs, service delivery and institutions.

As with the previous outcome, the choice to focus on this outcome leverages the Bank’s existing dialogues with and support to horizontal state accountability institutions such as supreme audit institutions, anti-corruption offices, information commissions, ombudsmen offices, and parliamentary and judiciary checks-and-balances institutions. Again, building on the Bank’s unique advantages in accessing and establishing working relationships with decision makers in these institutions, the GPSA seeks to identify civil society and state actors who may have shared or complementary objectives in the promotion of government accountability and good governance, and to connect these actors to each other.

Forging these collaborative relationships can take advantage of situations in which civil society organizations and state actors may have different resources and competencies that can serve as complementary inputs into political pressure for improved accountability. Collaboration in fostering greater government accountability is especially critical when inputs from civil society and state actors are not completely substitutable for each other. In these situations, collaboration between the two types of actors results in a higher level of output – in this case, improved accountability – than if there were no collaboration. Moreover weak formal oversight institutions -- legislators and supreme audit institutions – deprive civil society actors of an important route to influencing state actions and ensuring accountability.

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20 Horizontal state accountability institutions include agencies and offices within the state such as auditing agencies, oversight commissions, anticorruption commissions, ombudsmen, central banks, and personnel departments within line ministries. As part of the government itself, however, these institutions can find it difficult to establish legally authorized and/or actual autonomous oversight and sanctioning abilities. Susan Rose-Ackerman: From Elections to Democracy, 2005


22 The Bank, for example, has given grants and loans to supreme audit institutions on technical issues such as best practices in auditing, and has worked with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions and its regional chapters. Units such as the Social Development Department (SDV) have been working with provincial-level ombudman in Pakistan on how to facilitate interactions between citizens and the executive in post-conflict contexts. See, for example, the Social Development Department / Demand for Good Governance’s companion note to the GAC Update II and its section on Demand for Good Governance and Independent Accountability Institutions (Grandvoinnet).

23 Such collaboration constitutes what Elinor Ostrom has referred to as “coproduction,” or the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organization. Ostrom, chapter, State-Society Synergy, 86.

24 Ostrom refers to this type of collaboration or coproduction as “synergy” since it is impossible to achieve the same level of output with only input from one or the other type of actor. Ostrom, chapter, State-Society Synergy, 101-102.

In the case of Argentina, for example, officials in the General Audit Office (AGN) faced more potential issues for auditing than they could handle. To prioritize issues for auditing, they conducted a Participatory Planning Programme to incorporate feedback from civil society into the audit plan.\textsuperscript{26} State auditors had technical resources and capacity to conduct audits but lacked political authority to address problems uncovered by the audit beyond releasing their report. Civil society groups lacked incentives to use the reports. In this case, dialogue contributed to incorporating information from and the perspective of a wide variety of actors. Civil society can also provide information to auditors\textsuperscript{27} or contribute to strengthening compliance with audit recommendations. For instance, civil society partners can use the audit has evidence to lobby elected representatives to pass new laws, publicize the findings of the audit in press releases for the media, and support other advocacy activities to press for the sanctioning of poor performance and/or reforms to address underlying causes.

**D. Outputs**

The GPSA will produce three main outputs intended to work in conjunction with one another to effect change on the two main outcomes discussed above. Through its grant making and its knowledge and learning activities, the GPSA will (1) integrate problem-driven political economy analyses into the operational strategies of civil society organizations implementing social accountability initiatives; (2) apply problem-driven political economy analyses in the work of the Task Team Leaders (TTLs) and Country Management Units (CMUs) supporting GPSA grants; and (3) generate knowledge about the process of customizing social accountability interventions to specific political economy contexts through comparative analysis of grantee experiences that can inform and improve the operations of both grantees and the GPSA itself.

*The GPSA’s strategic problem-driven political economy approach to social accountability*

The GPSA’s approach to the promotion of social accountability relies on a *strategic* problem-driven political economy approach through which political economy analysis developed through *direct engagement with government decision makers* informs the strategy and tactics of CSOs designing and implementing social accountability initiatives.

Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society. It focuses on power and resources, how they are distributed and contested in

\textsuperscript{25}U4 case studies.
\textsuperscript{26} ACIJ 2010; U4 PRACTICE INSIGHT December 2013 No 5 When Supreme Audit Institutions engage with civil society. On SAIs and citizen engagement also see, Guillan Montero 2012; Peruzzotti 2010; Stapenhurst and O’Brien 2008; Reed 2012.
different country and sector contexts between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain, and transform these relationships over time. Political economy analysis involves more than a mapping of stakeholders and a review of institutional and governance arrangements – it also assesses interests, incentives, rents and rent distribution, historical legacies, prior experiences with reforms, and how all of these factors affect or impede change.28

A problem-driven political economy approach identifies a specific development challenge, assesses why the observed dysfunctional patterns are present, and identifies ways of initiating reform and change. In contrast to providing solely technical inputs to solve a particular problem, the GPSA will conduct strategic political economy analyses that not only identify the key actors who have influence over the specific problem of interest and assess their political incentives and constraints, but also evaluate the existing power dynamics and relationships. Mapping out the key actors, the ways in which they can influence the concrete problem of interest, and their incentives and constraints will enable the GPSA to identify political opportunities for reform and change within specific contexts to address particular problems, and to design strategies and operations that are feasible given a particular context.29

Moreover, the GPSA’s strategic approach to problem-driven political economy analysis also entails direct engagement with decision-makers that have authority over the service delivery chain or over the management and governance of the process of service delivery. While the starting point may be an initial analysis of government performance and mapping of power dynamics, political opportunities, and constraints, such analysis cannot be based on secondary data. Given that the process of social accountability should be designed to help solve a policy issue (involving one or more policy making stages), engagement with decision-makers is necessary in order to devise a realistic set of interventions that complement what the public sector is already doing to address the problem. Without this type of strategic political economy approach, the social accountability initiative may only be partially influential, or at worst, irrelevant.

In short, the GPSA’s strategic problem-driven political economy approach involves not only helping grantees apply standard political economy analysis to their strategy for social accountability, but a comprehensive social accountability approach that tightly couples political analysis with strategies and tactics.

Output 1: Integration of political economy analyses into GPSA grantee strategies

The first output the GPSA will produce is the integration of political economy analyses into the

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29 See Fritz and Levy, Problem-Driven PE Analysis.
strategies of GPSA grantees for project implementation. Integration of political economy analysis (PEA) into these operational strategies – both the initial ones outlined in the grant application as well as subsequent revisions responding to changes in the political economy context – means that CSOs will be able to articulate in both writing and in their day-to-day work why the specific reform or change within the government that the CSO is pursuing is feasible and actionable from the government’s point of view.

Integration of political economy analysis also entails justification by the CSO of why its strategies for building multi-stakeholder support, its plans for constructive engagement with government actors and collaboration with horizontal state accountability institutions, and its choice of social accountability tools are feasible and actionable, given the structure of the policy process in their context and the political incentives and constraints facing key government actors. This political economy analysis would include a power analysis, identify the formal and informal rules for government and service providers, evaluate the incentives of government and service providers, and specify what types of information would be actionable for these actors.

**How will the GPSA produce this output?**

The GPSA will produce this output through actions taken at all three stages of the grant making process – the call for proposals, the selection of grantees, and the implementation of grantee projects.

**Call for proposals and design of the grant.** First, during the call for proposals, the GPSA only operates in countries whose governments have voluntarily opted into the GPSA’s grant making program. By opting in, these governments are already more likely to be open to the implementation of collaborative strategies and working together with CSOs to identify political opportunities and openings in the policy process through political economy analysis.

Second, the GPSA works with the Bank’s country offices to assess the political economy context of each country and identify issue areas where there may already be windows of opportunity for constructive engagement and collaboration among CSO and government actors. Based on this assessment, they adapt the GPSA’s global mandate to the local context, tailoring the call for proposals to each country’s political economy context and identifying a different substantive focus for grant applications in each country.

Third, the time horizons for the grants are longer than typical social accountability grants, which give grantees time to take into account how political processes affect their operational strategies and to design and revise these strategies as the political economy context changes.

**Selection process.** As part of the grant application process, the GPSA requires CSO applicants to assess the political economy context of the concrete problems they hope to address through the implementation of social accountability initiatives. Applicants have to target concrete problems, identify the decision makers and decision-making processes relevant to these
problems, and describe in their applications how their proposals lever existing government systems to improve governmental performance and service delivery.

The GPSA then allocates grants to applicants that incorporate political thinking into their proposals and respond to suggestions from reviewers and the GPSA secretariat on how better to integrate and apply political economy analyses to their operational strategies.

Project implementation. During the course of the grantee’s project implementation, the GPSA will seek to utilize the Bank’s in-country assets, including country offices, ongoing funding portfolios, existing resources, and the Bank’s unique access to government officials in order to integrate a comprehensive and strategic problem-driven approach to social accountability, including a political economy analysis conducted through direct engagement with government decision makers and the development of an operational framework that is embedded into the actual policy making and implementation process about the problem at hand. Applicants, for example, receive feedback from their governments early in the project, thus opening opportunities for dialogue and identifying entry points for action that grantees might not be able to see or create on their own.

Moreover, the GPSA is willing to provide public goods to grantees and bear the costs of facilitating collective problem solving and action. In the process of revising the proposals and structuring the final project, the GPSA provides guidance to grantees to ensure that their social accountability initiative is realistic and can be feasibly implemented. This guidance includes the application of strategic political economy analysis but also encompasses other elements that are needed for an effective social accountability approach, such as selecting appropriate tools and mechanisms for citizen engagement and feedback generation that tap into ongoing decision making processes where feasible, or identifying cost-effective alternatives that might increase the ability of CSOs to implement self-sustaining processes.

The knowledge and learning component of the GPSA’s activities will also contribute to these objectives. This component will provide advice to grantee CSOs through the Bank’s in-house pool of global knowledge as well as by facilitating the provision of expertise about the design of specific social accountability tools and mechanisms when needed. This component will also provide opportunities to increase knowledge and skills about how to apply political economy approaches to specific projects and contexts. The GPSA’s knowledge component will also target government officials and Bank staff, and facilitate exchanges of tacit knowledge among officials, Bank staff, and CSOs. These exchanges can deepen the understanding of grantees about political economy drivers and obstacles to reform.

Finally, the GPSA will encourage the integration of a political economy approach into the operational strategies of grantees by not penalizing grantees that correct their course of action as a result of improved understanding of their political circumstances and the political economy context of their problem of interest.

Indicators
The Results Framework identifies two main indicators for the integration of political economy analyses into the operational strategies of GPSA grantees (see Table 1). First, can grantees explain – in their final project design before implementation and subsequent progress reports (RORs) – why they expect their requests for the government to be feasible and actionable from the government’s point of view.30

Second, can grantees explain in their final project design and subsequent documentation of their operational strategies why their strategies for building multi-stakeholder support, their plans for constructive engagement with government actors, and their choice of social accountability tools are realistic, given the structure of the policy process in their context and the political incentives and constraints facing key government actors.

Output 2: Application of strategic political economy approach to social accountability by the Bank’s Task Team Leaders and Country Management Units

The second output the GPSA will produce is the alignment of Task Team Leaders (TTLs) and Country Management Units (CMUs) with the GPSA’s strategic and comprehensive problem-driven political economy approach by the Task Team Leaders (TTLs) and Country Management Units (CMUs) associated with each grantee.

Each grantee project is handled by a Task Team Leader (TTL) who has overall responsibility for the project from inception to completion. The Task Team Leader is selected from the professional staff based on his or her experience and professional training. Country Management Units (CMUs) of the countries where grantees are located will also work with grantees and TTLs to oversee grantee projects. CMUs are responsible for Bank dialogue with the country and the preparation of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which is the basis for the Bank’s financial support to the country.

Each grantee’s Task Team Leader and Country Management Unit will assess the specific political economy context of each grantee’s intervention. They will help identify potential government partners for grantees, facilitate connections and meetings between government actors and CSO grantees, and invite CSOs to existing policy dialogues between the Bank and the country government on related issues.

TTLs and CMUs will also provide information to GPSA grantees on how the policy cycle works, help identify entry points into the policy cycle where CSOs can provide inputs and participate in discussions with government decision makers. They will also help CSOs identify the kinds of

30 Measurement of this indicator might include evidence from the final project design (after approval by the GPSA before implementation) and from subsequent progress reports that grantees have designed and implemented social accountability initiatives that are generating systematic feedback about the problem being addressed, about adjustments to the process being incorporated as a result of learning; evidence from these sources that the social accountability process is being implemented through collaborative engagement with relevant decision makers; and evidence from these sources that feedback through a combination of social accountability tools and mechanisms is being used by decision makers and leading to actual adjustments in policy making and implementation processes to solve the problem of interest.
information that can sway public officials and help information from CSOs reach public officials in both the executive and in state accountability institutions.

**How will the GPSA produce this output?**

The GPSA will work with TTLs and CMUs to provide grantees with continued implementation support through its Knowledge Platform in the form of mentoring and technical assistance via Bank and external resources. For example, when grantees face specific implementation issues, the GPSA will facilitate a process of discussion through the technical assistance facility / pilot social accountability lab, which will involve TTLs, government counterparts, and specific experts from both within and outside the Bank. The GPSA will also work with TTLs and CMUs to provide grantees through the Knowledge Component with opportunities for accessing a pool of global knowledge and for exchanging amongst themselves targeted knowledge and learning about specific topics within the GPSA’s strategic political economy approach to social accountability that they want to refine and improve, such as methodologies for social accountability, systems for monitoring and evaluation.

**Indicators**

The first indicator for this output will be measured by asking the grantees to report on the extent to which Task Team Leaders and Country Management Units helped them to identify key government actors and facilitate relationships with them. Specific components of this indicator are specified in Table 1.

The second indicator for this output is the degree to which TTLs and CMUS customized global knowledge to inform the strategies and actions of civil society organizations. Specifically, did CMUs customize the call for proposals for each country context? Did CMUs customize the orientation sessions for potential applicants for each country context? Did TTLs and CMUs cite global knowledge and adaptation of this global knowledge in their justification of why they signed off on mid-course corrections in the operational strategies of the grantees?

**Output 3: Knowledge and learning from comparative analysis of the GPSA’s approach to Social Accountability**

The third output produced by the GPSA will be knowledge and learning from comparative analysis and sharing of aggregated lessons from the GPSA’s approach to social accountability.

The GPSA has a unique emphasis on constructive engagement with government decision makers and collaboration between social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions. As noted earlier, there is a consensus emerging that neither government actors on their own nor civil society actors on their own can produce improved government transparency or accountability.

Yet few have had the comparative advantages that the Bank has in facilitating these
cooperative and collaborative relationships. As a result, the existing state of knowledge about how this approach actually works and under what conditions is relatively undeveloped.\textsuperscript{31}

By engaging in careful comparisons of similar social accountability initiatives implemented by grantees in contexts with similar background conditions, the GPSA can assist grantees by identifying possible differences in contextual conditions that might lead to differences in the success of these initiatives. Structured comparisons of grantee experiences result in operationally useful learning for grantees and generate practical knowledge about how best to customize social accountability interventions to specific political economy contexts. Such comparisons help to identify lessons from the political economy work conducted by civil society organizations such as the type of information and incentives that are critical for the success of social accountability initiatives; the processes of constructive engagement and the role played by brokers or interlocutors;\textsuperscript{32} and the experiences of civil society collaboration with horizontal state accountability institutions.\textsuperscript{33}

Careful, structured comparisons of grantee experiences thus result in operationally useful learning for grantees as well as knowledge that may be useful to a broader community of practitioners, a public good that the GPSA has a mandate to provide according to its Board Paper.

Moreover, structured, focused comparisons of lessons aggregated from the GPSA grantees are also critical for informing revisions and improvements to the design of the GPSA program itself.

These comparisons will take advantage of knowledge that grantees themselves produce through the funding in the grant that is allocated to knowledge and learning as well as knowledge produced directly by the GPSA. And of course the GPSA will generate the structured, focused comparisons of grantee experiences.

**How will the GPSA produce this output?**

The GPSA will produce and commission publications that capture comparative lessons about the implementation of the GPSA model of social accountability produced through structured and focused comparisons of matched case studies.

The GPSA will also share knowledge through Knowledge Portal activities such as webinars and e-forums, the GPSA’s Brown Bag Lunch sessions (BBLs), the GPSA grantees workshop and Global Partners Forum, and the Transparency/Accountability Lab pilot.

**How will we know that the GPSA has produced this output?**

There are two main indicators for this output. The first is the number of knowledge products –

\textsuperscript{31} McGee and Gaventa 2010, Fung and Kosack forthcoming, Fox 2014.

\textsuperscript{32} See, for example, Anirudh Krishna on brokers, and Jonathan Fox on interlocutors.

\textsuperscript{33} E. Peruzotti refers to this kind of collaboration as the “societalization of horizontal accountability institutions.”
including memos, reports, webinars, e-forums, Brown Bag Lunch sessions (BBLs) etc. – capturing comparative lessons, and the quality of the comparative analyses about the implementation of the GPSA model of social accountability in these publications. Are the comparisons structured, matched, and justified in terms of contextual conditions?

The second indicator is the perceptions of grantees, TTLs, and CMUs for participating countries of the usefulness of GPSA knowledge products and activities for their decision-making and actions. Have they actually applied knowledge and learning from these products and activities to make decisions about mid-course corrections? Have these products and activities helped them to carry out their own knowledge and learning, which is an integral part of each grant?

E. Contextual Factors

Outcomes result from a combination of the GPSA’s outputs – which are directly produced by the GPSA and thus directly under their control – and a range of contextual factors, which are beyond the control of the GPSA.

This section discusses a number of contextual factors that have been identified by key stakeholders as factors that are likely to influence the GPSA’s opportunities and constrain their ability and their partners’ abilities to affect the two main outcomes of the GPSA’s theory of change.

Again, indicators for contextual factors should be distinguished clearly from indicators for the outcomes and outputs identified by the GPSA’s theory of change. Outputs are directly produced by the GPSA and completely under their control. Thus, the GPSA will be evaluated on their production of these outputs. By producing these outputs, the GPSA seeks to affect the outcomes in their theory of change. Their outputs should have a direct effect on these outcomes. Thus, the GPSA will also be evaluated on whether their outputs have a causal impact on these outcomes.

Outcomes, however, are not purely a function of the GPSA’s activities. The perfect social accountability initiative and problem-driven political economy approach may still fail to result in constructive engagement between civil society actors and executive decision makers if, for example, something changes in the political, economic, or social context – a military coup, an election, etc.

Outcomes are thus distinguished from outputs in that they are not completely under the control of the GPSA, due to contextual factors. It is some of these contextual factors that we discuss below.

Space for civil society to operate. This category encompasses the existing characteristics of the
political, institutional, and social environment in which civil society organizations operate.\(^{34}\) Most importantly, these characteristics include the existence — and more importantly, the enforcement — of the constitutional rights that directly relate to the functioning of civil society such as civil liberties, information rights, and freedoms of the press.\(^{35}\)

**Level of government openness.** The pre-existing level of government openness is likely to influence the impact of any social accountability intervention on the behavior of state actors. Important aspects of government openness include minimal levels of fiscal transparency, access to information, and legal requirements for disclosures of income and assets for elected and senior public officials.\(^{36}\)

**State capacity, or quality of public sector management.** In order for any intervention to improve service delivery and government performance, the state has to have some capacity for delivering services and for implementing reforms. This category includes the quality of public sector management, or the management of resources by various arms of the public administration. It also includes aspects of organizational capacity — the amount of resources available to agents with responsibilities for improving service delivery and government performance as well as the quality of those resources (such as the qualifications of staff).\(^{37}\)

**Level of political accountability.** The pre-existing level of political accountability will of course also affect the potential for government responsiveness to social accountability initiatives and proposals for cooperation and collaboration. Political accountability can be evaluated in terms of the formal institutions that exist to create incentives or imperatives for political leaders and public bodies to wield their authority in ways that are in compliance with the country’s laws and reflect the interest of the citizenry, such as the electoral system, the degree of electoral competition, and the institutionalization of a multi-party system.\(^{38}\)

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\(^{35}\) The International Center for Nonprofit Law publishes reports on the legal framework for civil society in many countries and indicators for some countries, but many of the GPSA countries are not covered by their work.

\(^{36}\) These criteria overlap with the minimum eligibility criteria required by the Open Government Partnership for governments interested in participating. See [http://www.opengovpartnership.org/how-it-works/how-join/eligibility-criteria](http://www.opengovpartnership.org/how-it-works/how-join/eligibility-criteria). The OGP uses the following indicators to assess these criteria: Fiscal transparency is assessed in terms of publication of the Executive’s Budget Proposal and Audit Reports, based on a subset of indicators from the Open Budget Index, constructed by the International Budget Partnership, which covers 100 countries. See [http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/](http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/). Legal guarantees of access to information is assessed using information from Right2Info.org, a collaboration of the Open Society Institute Justice Initiative and Access Info Europe that covers 197 countries. See [http://right2info.org/access-to-information-laws](http://right2info.org/access-to-information-laws). Disclosure requirements for public officials are measured using the following World Bank sources: a 2009 World Bank-commissioned survey on disclosure entitled “Disclosure by Politicians;” a 2009 World Bank study titled, “Income and asset disclosure in World Bank client countries,” by Richard Messick, and OECS Governance at a Glance 2009.

\(^{37}\) See, for example, the Actionable Governance Indicators on Public Sector Management compiled by PRMPS.

\(^{38}\) See, for example, the Actionable Governance Indicators on Political Accountability compiled by PRMPS.
Institutionalization of checks and balances, and horizontal state accountability institutions. The pre-existing institutionalization of state accountability institutions such as legislative oversight mechanisms, judicial review, and independent oversight institutions also influence the probability that the GPSA will be able to foster collaboration and constructive engagement between civil society initiatives and these institutions.  

F. Assumptions

The theory of change outlined in this Results Framework has three main categories of assumptions: (1) assumptions about contextual factors in country contexts; (2) assumptions about the capacity and operations of the grantee civil society organizations; and (3) assumptions about the resources and operations of the GPSA and the Bank.

Assumptions about country contextual factors. The GPSA is only likely to have an impact on the main outcomes in its theory of change – constructive engagement between civil society organizations and actors in the government executive, and collaboration between grantee’s social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions – in country contexts that have at least minimal levels of the contextual factors discussed in the previous section.

Without constitutional and legal guarantees that are actually enforced, for example, civil society organizations are unlikely to take actions that could result in negative consequences from opponents within government, even when those actions are aimed at building constructive engagement and collaboration with government actors. Political conflict within the government, between groups or individuals with different interests, mean that without protected space for civil society to operate, civil society organizations may be unlikely to be able to implement meaningful social accountability initiatives.

The GPSA’s problem-driven and strategic political economy approach to social accountability also assumes minimal levels of government openness and political accountability. Without some government openness and political accountability, civil society organizations are unlikely to be able to obtain the information about government performance that they need in order to monitor government and implement social accountability initiatives. Moreover, they are unlikely to be able to find the partners and allies within government that they need in order to influence decision-making processes, or even to obtain basic information about policy cycles, entry points, and the political incentives and constraints facing key actors.

Facilitating collaboration between with horizontal state institutions and the grantee’s social accountability initiatives of course also requires the existence of horizontal state accountability institutions that are functioning and have some technical and operational capacity.

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39 See, for example, the Actionable Governance Indicators on Checks and Balances compiled by PRMPS.
Finally, civil society organizations are unlikely to have an impact, or even be willing to take action or initiate cooperation in the first place, unless they believe that the state has some capacity to implement reforms and improve service delivery. In country contexts, where civil society organizations do not believe the state has the ability to improve service delivery and performance, it may not be rational for them to take any action to advocate for better public sector performance. In these contexts, citizens and civil society organizations often opt for self-provision, or to substitute for state functions and service delivery provision themselves.

Assumptions about CSO grantee capacity. The GPSA’s theory of change also assumes that CSO grantees have sufficient knowledge, experience, and capacity for social accountability initiatives, building multi-stakeholder coalitions, and developing collaborative relationships with state actors. Prior knowledge, experience, and organizational capacity are particularly important for the GPSA’s problem-driven and strategic political economy approach as this approach requires grantees to step back and assess the power dynamics and political context in which they work, and to strategize about where they are most likely to be able to influence decision making processes. This approach requires grantees to have a degree of political sophistication, analytical ability, and capacity for reflection that not all civil society organizations may have. The GPSA evaluates these assumptions to the best of their ability during the selection process of grantees, but to some extent, they remain assumptions.

Assumptions about GPSA and Bank processes. First, the GPSA assumes increased operational capacity and administrative resources over the next two years as it moves to a full slate of grantees on three-year contracts. This assumption is a critical one, given the small size of the GPSA as a unit.

Specifically, the GPSA’s theory of change assumes that the GPSA will have sufficient capacity and resources to assist grantees and their TTLs in carrying out a strategic problem-driven political economy analysis of the context for the intervention and to provide guidance and knowledge about customizing social accountability initiatives to particular contexts. This approach assumes that the GPSA will have the personnel and expertise to help and/or train grantees and TTLs to analyze the power dynamics of their contexts and how to identify political opportunities for successful action.

Note that this approach assumes that the GPSA will have sufficient time and resources to devote to understanding some detail about the political contexts facing grantees, particularly in the first six months of the grant as the grantees and TTLs are conducting their own strategic political economy analyses in preparation for identifying potential government partners and allies, formulating strategies for constructive engagement and collaboration that TTLs and CMUs can help facilitate, and developing proposals to state actors for ways of moving forward that are actionable and feasible from the point of view of state actors.

In sum, the GPSA’s approach to social accountability is one that requires significant levels of political sophistication, analysis, and strategizing as well as familiarity with specific country contexts and policy cycles. The degree of knowledge and analysis required assumes that the
GPSA has sufficient capacity and manpower to provide this knowledge and analysis and/or to provide training and support to build capacity for this knowledge and analysis among grantees.

Second, the GPSA’s theory of change assumes a high level of cooperation and communication between the GPSA and the TTLs for grantees. Because of the GPSA’s strategic political economy approach and its reliance on TTLs to link grantees with key state actors and potential government partners, it is critical that communication loops between the GPSA, TTLs and grantees will be closed through informal and, ideally, formal cooperation. Cooperation and communication between the GPSA and TTLs is important throughout the period of a grant, but particularly so in the first 6-12 months when grantees are intensively engaged in developing and revising their strategic plans for design, implementation, and action. Given the current responsibilities of TTLs for trust fund projects and the limitations of the GPSA’s personnel power, this assumption is also a critical one.

**G. GPSA Monitoring and Evaluation System**

Evaluations and reviews of global partnership programs have identified the lack of a monitoring and evaluation system as a recurrent problem. Without such a system, neither learning nor accountability can take place adequately, thus jeopardizing the quality and value of the program.

The GPSA’s monitoring and evaluation system builds on this Results Framework. Monitoring and evaluation of the GPSA will include selective impact evaluations, systematic reviews or meta-studies, as well as real-time monitoring and evaluation through the collection of feedback from governments and grantees to facilitate learning and adaptation.

**Grant component monitoring and reporting.** Monitoring and reporting at the grant level will take place through the following mechanisms.

First, grantees will provide bi-annual financial and substantive activity progress reports (Results-Oriented Reports, or RORs) to the TTL and to the GPSA Secretariat. The substantive section of the RORs will include evidence and stories of success and failure, indicating the way in which learning is taking place, and how government responds to the interventions. The information at this micro-level can be used to track goals, highlighting achievements and problems, operating as a real-time monitoring and self-evaluation system, using a participatory process to collect feedback from government and grantees, and generating information which can be used to allow for timely corrective actions. Information from the RORs will enable the Bank to assess whether milestones required for annual disbursements are met by the grantees.

Second, grantees will send fully updated versions of their own Results Frameworks once a year in advance of the Bank’s disbursements against the project outputs and milestones required of the grantee.
Third, TTLs will meet in person with grantees in advance of the TTL’s annual report on the grant and the use of the Bank’s Grants Reporting Mechanism (GRM) (recommended but not required for trust funds). This annual report and documentation from the mission such as reports, memos, etc. that is attached to the GRM will also be used to assess progress on the grant and whether mid-course corrections are needed. TTLs may also conduct additional field visits to monitor grants’ implementation and provide technical assistance to grantees.

**Knowledge and learning component monitoring.** As established in the TF Handbook, for Bank-Executed Knowledge activities, reporting will be carried out through the Grant Reporting and Monitoring (GRM) module, which includes progress and completion reports. In addition, Bank-Executed Knowledge products will be disseminated through the GPSA’s Knowledge Platform.

**Program level monitoring and reporting.** Information from the substantive activity section of the bi-annual Results-Oriented Reports (RORs) will also be used for the monitoring and evaluation of the GPSA’s overall program. The data from the bi-annual RORs will be assessed, coded, and recorded by the GPSA. The RORs are prepared and submitted electronically, and contain standardized information across all grants, in order to facilitate the collection of data and indicators that will be used for analysis and for evaluation of both grant projects and of the GPSA program. RORs will thus include information required by the grant’s own Results Framework and M&E plans as well as by the GPSA’s overall Results Framework. Standardization of sections of the RORs will enable aggregation of data from individual grantee reports by the GPSA, which can be used by the GPSA to generate knowledge and learning outputs for grantees and for feeding back into the design of the GPSA’s components.

Similarly, the annual updated versions sent by grantees of their own Results Frameworks in advance of the Bank’s disbursements against the project outputs and milestones will also provide data for monitoring of the GPSA’s overall program. Data on a few of the indicators provided by grantees in their own Results Frameworks will also be aligned with the GPSA program’s Results Frameworks so that these data can be assessed, coded, and recorded by the GPSA for monitoring and evaluation of the overall program.

Annual reports from TTLs and their use of the Grants Reporting Mechanism (GRM) template will also contribute data on indicators for the GPSA’s overall program. In addition to qualitative assessment and/or quantitative coding of the TTL reports, questions will also be added to the GRM template to collect information on specific indicators for monitoring of the GPSA’s overall program. TTLs may also conduct additional field visits to utilize rapid appraisal methods (such as direct observation and key informant interviews) to collect data relevant for measuring the GPSA’s indicators for GPSA program outputs and outcomes.

Finally, the GPSA Secretariat will submit Annual Progress Reports to the Steering Committee that may be used for monitoring and reporting of the overall GPSA program.

**Program level evaluation.** Independent, external evaluation is a governance responsibility. As
recommended by IEG (usually retiree)’s assessment of global partnership programs, it is important that the GPSA’s governing body (Steering Committee) takes ownership of independent evaluation. The first independent external evaluation will be carried out at the end of the Program’s second year of implementation, with periodic follow-ups. Key questions for external evaluation are: (1) ideas for improving the links and accountability relations of the GPSA and the Task Team Leaders; (2) strengthening the assumptions about GPSA and Bank communication and coordination processes laid out in the Assumptions sections; 3) improving comparative analysis produced by the GPSA’s Knowledge Component and the feedback from the Knowledge Component into improvements in the design of the GPSA program itself.
Table 1: Indicators Table for GPSA Results Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1: Integration of political economy analyses into GPSA grantee strategies</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Suggested measurement strategies</th>
<th>Suggested data source(s)</th>
<th>Responsibility for data collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1:</td>
<td>Grantee explains in their initial grant application and subsequent biannual reports (RORs) why they expect their asks for the government to be feasible and actionable from the government’s point of view.</td>
<td>Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in grant applications and biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures. Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs.</td>
<td>Grant application (Question 2.1 in Round 1 application section on Proposal Objectives) Relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee on justification of asks and mid-course corrections GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed by TTLs</td>
<td>Grantees Task Team Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2:</td>
<td>Grantee provides an assessment of the political (not just technical) feasibility and actionability of its choice of social accountability tools and strategies for pushing its shared objectives with government actors forward</td>
<td>Qualitative assessment and/or coding into quantitative measures of Questions 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.3, and 3.4.3 in Round 1 application Qualitative assessment and/or coding into quantitative measures of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) on three key operational strategies: (1) strategy for building multi-stakeholder support; (2) strategy for constructive engagement; (3) choice of SA tools. Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs.</td>
<td>Relevant sections in grant applications and biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures. GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs</td>
<td>Grantees Task Team Leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator 1:</td>
<td>Qualitative or quantitative measures of questions such as the following:</td>
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</table>
| TTLs and CMUs help to identify key government actors and allies with influence over the identified problem(s) and facilitate relationships between grantees and these key government actors | Did TTLs and CMUs –  
- Identify potential partners in government for the CSOs?  
- Help CSOs contact these partners?  
- Set up meetings between CSOs and potential government partners?  
- Help clarify how the policy cycle works  
- Identify entry points into policy cycle  
- Help identify the kinds of information that can sway public officials  
- Help information from CSOs reach public officials  
- Invite CSOs to existing policy dialogues between Bank and country government  
- Connect CSOs to other Bank staff that can help with these things |
| NB. Higher, constant numbers are not necessarily better. An independent evaluator should make contextual assessment of the trajectory of CSO-government relationships and the relevance/need of WB action. |

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<tr>
<th>Output 2: Application of political economy approach by Task Team Leaders and Country Management Units</th>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator 2:</th>
<th>Qualitative assessment and/or coding into quantitative measures of Call for Proposals (CFPs) and orientation session materials to assess customization to each country context, and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customization of global knowledge to country context to inform grantee strategies and</td>
<td>CFPs, orientation session materials, TTL ISRs/GRMs</td>
</tr>
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GPSA responsible for collecting the documentation
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<th>actions</th>
<th>Qualitative assessment and/or coding into quantitative measures of regular reports and GRMs by TTLs to determine whether TTLs and CMUs cite global knowledge and adaptation of this global knowledge in their justification of why they signed off on mid-course corrections by CSOs. (For example, TTLs note that we know that elections can affect political appointees within the executive so this mid-course correction by the grantee responds to the expected effects of elections in this country context.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Output 3: Knowledge and learning from comparative analysis of GPSA’s approach to Social Accountability | Indicator 1: Number of publications capturing comparative lessons - quality of comparative analysis -- structured, matched, justified in terms of scope conditions, etc. -- about the implementation of the GPSA model of Social Accountability through constructive multi-stakeholder engagement and collaboration with state institutions. Qualitative assessment and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures of the Terms of Reference agreements (TORs) for GPSA knowledge products (e.g. dissemination notes, minutes from virtual and F2F forums, BBLs, workshops and convenings, summaries of exchanges in the portal, working papers) in terms of the following:
- Do the products focus on issues associated with political economy analysis (incentives, actors, formal and informal institutions, etc.)?
- Do the products convey comparative knowledge and relevant examples from different regions/sectors?
- Do the products use systematic |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TORs for commissioning publication and similar documents setting the scope and quality of the product/activities</th>
<th>GPSA responsible for collating the documentation</th>
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comparative analyses such as (1) comparing the experiences and outcomes of grantees operating in similar country or sectoral contexts with similar political, institutional, economic, and social background conditions to identify why grantees operating in similar contexts may have different experiences; or (2) comparing grantees that have had similar experiences and outcomes but in very different country or sectoral contexts in order to identify the factors leading to the similar outcomes?

- Do the products discuss the applicability of insights to other places and identify concrete contextual factors that bound the applicability of insights?

- Do the products discuss issues related to capacity and feasibility (opportunities, constraints, costs and risks) of implementing lessons learned?

- Are the issues covered in the knowledge and learning products integrated with the grant-making component and GPSA’s expected outcomes or are they independent of grantee operational strategies and experiences?

- Do the products focus on big-picture/cross-sectoral issues important for the grants (which is where the Bank has a comparative advantage), vs. specific solutions to narrow problems?
- Are the products focused on how-to questions such as those relevant for output 2 indicator 1 rather than purely technical questions (such as the best design for a report card)? For example, does the product examine how grantees get from receiving the GPSA funds to the outcome? What is their strategic plan of action? Under what conditions, for example, is lobbying a better strategy than training community leaders?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2:</th>
<th>Coding of survey and interview data into quantitative measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of grantees, TTLs and CMUs (in countries where the GPSA operates) of the usefulness of GPSA knowledge products/activities for their analysis, decision making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantees and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs</td>
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| Outcome 1: Constructive engagement with executive decision-makers |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Indicator 1: | Survey and interview questions for grantees such as the following: |
| | - Out of the total number of requests made to relevant government counterparts, how many of these requests received any response at all (acknowledgement of |

Survey and interviews of grantees, TTLs, and CMUs
Relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee on justification of asks and mid-course corrections
GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed by TTLs
Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews)

Survey of grantees or representative sample of grantees
Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative
GPSA responsible for collecting data from grantees on a regular basis
| counterparts | request, written message, invitation to meeting, forum, etc.? How satisfactory was this response?  
  - Has discussion been initiated / resumed?  
  - Has collaboration increased or improved?  
  - Have you made new contacts with relevant government counterparts? Have these contacts been sustained beyond a single contact or meeting?  
  - Have your interactions with government counterparts and partners helped to clarify how the policy cycle works and identify entry points into the policy cycle?  
  - Have your interactions with government counterparts helped you to identify and produce the kinds of information that can sway the decisions of public officials?  
  - Have your government counterparts helped deliver and dissemination information produced by you to other public officials?  
  - Have you been invited to existing policy dialogues between Bank and country government?  
  - Have your government counterparts helped you to diagnose key problems?  
  - Have your government counterparts measures.  
  Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs  
  Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews)  
  Memo(s) or other communication from participants or other stakeholders describing how collaboration has increased or improved  
  Survey or interview questions asking participants or other stakeholders about increase or | Grantees  
  Task Team Leaders |
| Indicator 2: Constructive engagement among grantee’s CSO partners and relevant government counterparts | Survey and interview questions for grantees and their CSO partners such as the following:  
- Out of the total number of requests made to relevant government counterparts by the grantee’s CSO partners, how many of these requests received any response at all (acknowledgement of request, written message, invitation to meeting, forum, etc.)? How satisfactory was this response?  
- Have the grantee’s CSO partners made new contacts with relevant government counterparts? Have these contacts been sustained beyond a single contact or meeting?  
- Have the grantee’s CSO partners’ interactions with government counterparts and partners helped to clarify how the policy cycle works and identify entry points into the policy cycle?  
- Have the grantee’s CSO partners’ interactions with government counterparts helped to identify and produce the kinds of information that can sway the decisions of public officials?  
- Have the grantee’s CSO partners’ government counterparts helped deliver and dissemination information produced by you | Improvement in collaboration. | Survey of grantees or representative sample of grantees  
Survey of grantee partners or representative sample of grantee partners  
Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.  
Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs  
Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews)  
Memo(s) or other communication from participants or other stakeholders stating that the discussion was initiated/resumed/activated; that consensus was reached on the formulation of a strategy  
Rapid appraisal methods that ask about increase or improvement in | GPSA responsible for collating the documentation and collecting data from grantees  
Grantees  
Task Team Leader |
| **Indicator 3:**  
Constructive engagement between beneficiary participants in GPSA project and relevant local authorities in terms of communication of beneficiary feedback and increased opportunity for feedback loops between citizens and government | Survey and interview questions for grantees and/or beneficiary participants in GPSA project such as the following:  
- Out of the total number of contacts and requests made to service providers and local authorities responsible for service provision, how many of these contacts and requests received any response at all (acknowledgement of request, written message, invitation to meeting, forum, etc.)? How satisfactory was this response?  
- Have beneficiary participants made new contacts with service providers and local authorities responsible for service provision? Have these contacts been sustained beyond a single contact or meeting?  
- Have the beneficiary participants’ | Survey of grantees and/or beneficiaries  
Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.  
Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs  
Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews) | GPSA responsible for collating the documentation and collecting data from grantees  
Grantees  
Task Team Leaders |
| **Outcome 2: Collaboration between CSOs and Social Accountability Institutions** | **Indicator 1:** Collaboration between social accountability initiatives of grantee (lead implementing CSO) and state accountability institutions | Survey and interview questions for grantees such as the following:
- Out of the total number of requests made to actors within state accountability institutions, how many of these requests received any response at all (acknowledgement of request, written message, invitation to meeting, forum, etc.)? How satisfactory was this response?
- Has discussion been initiated / resumed?
- Has collaboration increased or improved?
- Have you made new contacts with actors within state accountability institutions? Have these contacts been sustained beyond a single contact or meeting?
- Have your interactions with actors within state accountability institutions helped to |
| | | |
| | | Survey of grantees or representative sample of grantees
Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.
Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs
Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews)
Memo(s) or other communication from participants or other stakeholders stating that the discussion was |
| | | GPSA responsible for collating the documentation and collecting data from grantees
Grantees
Task Team Leaders |
| | | |

interactions with service providers and local authorities helped to clarify how decisions about service provision are made and to identify entry points into the decision making processes?

- Have the beneficiary participants’ interactions with service providers and local authorities helped to identify and produce the kinds of information that can sway their decisions about service provision?

Survey of grantees or representative sample of grantees
Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.
Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs
Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews)
Memo(s) or other communication from participants or other stakeholders stating that the discussion was
clarify how state accountability institutions work and potential complementarities between social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions?

- Have your interactions with actors within state accountability institutions helped you to identify and produce the kinds of information that can sway the decisions of public officials?

- Have your actors within state accountability institutions helped deliver and disseminate information produced by you to other public officials?

- Have you been invited to existing policy dialogues between the Bank and state accountability institutions?

- Have actors within state accountability institutions worked together with you to formulate action plans and steps?

initiated/resumed/activated; that consensus was reached on the formulation of a strategy

Rapid appraisal methods that ask about increase or improvement in collaboration, e.g., mini-surveys, key informant interviews, and focus group interviews

Memo(s) or other communication from participants or other stakeholders describing how collaboration has increased or improved

Survey or interview questions asking participants or other stakeholders about increase or improvement in collaboration

**Indicator 2:**
Collaboration between grantee’s CSO partners and state accountability institutions

Survey and interview questions for grantees and grantee partners such as the following:

- Out of the total number of requests made to actors within state accountability institutions, how many of these requests received any response at all (acknowledgement of request, written message, invitation to meeting, forum, etc.)? How satisfactory was this response?

- Has discussion been initiated / resumed?

Survey of grantees or representative sample of grantees

Survey of grantee partners or representative sample of grantee partners

Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
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<tr>
<td>Has collaboration increased or improved?</td>
<td>Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs</td>
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<td>Have grantee partners made new contacts with actors within state accountability institutions? Have these contacts been sustained beyond a single contact or meeting?</td>
<td>Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews)</td>
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<td>Have grantee partners’ interactions with actors within state accountability institutions helped to clarify how state accountability institutions work and potential complementarities between social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions?</td>
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<td>Have actors within state accountability institutions worked together with you to formulate action plans and steps?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Indicator 3: Collaboration between beneficiary participants in GPSA project and local state accountability institutions | Survey and interview questions for grantees and/or beneficiary participants in GPSA project such as the following:

- Out of the total number of requests made to actors within local state accountability institutions by beneficiary participants, how many of these requests received any response at all (acknowledgement of request, written message, invitation to meeting, forum, etc.)? How satisfactory was this response?

- Have beneficiary participants made new contacts with actors within local state accountability institutions? Have these contacts been sustained beyond a single contact or meeting?

- Have beneficiaries’ interactions with actors within local state accountability institutions helped to clarify how state accountability institutions work and potential complementarities between social accountability initiatives and state accountability institutions? | Survey of grantees and/or beneficiaries

Qualitative assessment of relevant sections in biannual reports (RORs) from grantee and/or coding of assessment into quantitative measures.

Qualitative or quantitative data gathered through GPSA questions added to the ISRs/GRMs filed regularly by the TTLs

Rapid appraisal methods (e.g., direct observation and key informant interviews) |

| Contextual Factor 1: Existing Space for Civil Society to Operate | Indicator 1: De jure and de facto protections for civil liberties, information rights, and freedom of the press | CSO Sustainability Index

Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index’s Civil Liberties sub-indicator (used by the Open Government Partnership for minimum eligibility criteria)

Freedom House Accountability and Public Voice Index | http://www.interaction.org/civil-society-organization-sustainability-index


http://www.freedomhouse.org/report
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<th>Contextual Factor 2: Pre-existing Level of Government Openness</th>
<th>Indicator 1: Pre-existing level of fiscal transparency</th>
<th>Whether or not the Executive’s Budget Proposal and Audit Reports are published, based on subset of indicators from the Open Budget Index, constructed by the International Budget Partnership (used by the Open Government Partnership for minimum eligibility criteria)</th>
<th><a href="http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/">http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/</a></th>
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<td>Contextual Factor 4: Pre-existing Level of Political Accountability</td>
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<td>Indicator 2: Quality of rule of law</td>
<td>World Justice Project Rule of Law Index</td>
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